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I 
INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Importance of Regulatory Reform 
In January 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,563, 
which addresses review of administrative regulations.1 Announced by 
the President on the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal,2 this 
initiative has far-reaching potential. Administrative regulation is the 
issue that will not go away. This perennial political piñata, which has 
provided a target for generations of politicians, has new potency in an 
era of “death panels” and the “government takeover of healthcare.”  
The federal government’s responses to crises such as the Upper Big 
Branch Mine explosion,3 the Deepwater Horizon oil platform fire and 
spill,4 and the near-collapse of the nation’s economic system have 
legitimized critics of government regulation, regardless of their point 
of view. 
In May of 2011, the White House released agency reports 
responding to the executive order.5 These reports marked the start of a 
public review process of existing and new regulations. However, it is 
now time to go beyond merely weeding out redundant, outmoded, and 
ineffective regulations. That exercise, while useful, fails to address 
the nature of the regulatory process itself and what it means for 
American governance. 
The discussion of regulatory reform should be a discussion of how 
the federal government does business. There is a tremendous 
 
1 Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 
3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
2 Barack Obama, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System: If the FDA Deems 
Saccharin Safe Enough for Coffee, then the EPA Should Not Treat It as Hazardous Waste, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527 
48703396604576088272112103698.html. 
3 Sabrina Tavernise, Report Faults Mine Owner for Explosion That Killed 29, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 19, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/us/20mine.html. 
4 See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF 
OFFSHORE DRILLING: RECOMMENDATIONS (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.oilspill 
commission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OSC_Deep_Water_Summary_Recommenda
tions_FINAL.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., Dep’t of Justice, PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF 
EXISTING RULES, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 18, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/files 
/documents/2011-regulatory-action-plans/DepartmentofJusticePreliminaryRegulatory 
ReformPlan.pdf. 
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opportunity to craft better programs to create more value for the 
public and regulated entities, and to demonstrate the capacity of the 
political process to solve problems and make improvements. 
This Article will examine the importance of a fresh approach to the 
federal regulatory process. Such an approach is important because 
regulation goes to the very core of governance. Regulation is how 
things are accomplished in the United States—how resources are 
allocated and activities are overseen. All the major domestic issues of 
the day—health, energy, infrastructure, climate, and finance—have 
significant regulatory components. Given the pervasive impact of 
regulation, the goal of regulatory reform should not just be to adopt a 
better approach to the regulatory process, but also to form a building 
block of trust and value-sharing that will promote better governance 
through a less toxic political atmosphere. At a time when the Obama 
administration and Congress have gone head-to-head over the 
executive confirmation process, government shutdowns, and the 
national debt, the stakes are high. 
B.  Regulatory Reform Presents an Opportunity 
We urgently need to enact long-term, comprehensive, and often 
counter-intuitive solutions to address the challenges our nation faces. 
Unfortunately, such solutions are ill-suited for today’s political 
climate or for the preferred communication tools of sound bites, 
blogs, Twitter feeds, and YouTube videos. 
That is why the Obama Administration’s current interest in 
regulatory reform is so significant. For a generation, every President 
has been involved with regulatory reform to some extent. Ronald 
Reagan created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.6 In 
1993, Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866, entitled 
“Regulatory Planning and Review,” and asked Vice President Gore to 
lead a review and reform of federal regulation.7 However, reforming 
the regulatory process offers the Obama administration a critical 
opportunity to improve the federal government’s effectiveness as well 
as our political process. Rather than another instance of “business as 
usual,” regulatory reform is more important now than ever before. 
 
6 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, About OIRA, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 8, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_administrator. 
7 Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 
30, 1993). 
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II 
THE PROMISE OF PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION 
A.  The Pacific Northwest Experience 
For over a third of a century, I have been deeply involved with 
public policy, environmental protection, and infrastructure 
development in the Portland metropolitan area. As a result, I’ve 
accumulated firsthand experience with federal regulation from the 
perspective of the regulated, as our community has earned a 
reputation for livability, environmental protection, and innovative 
design. We pioneered the early development of light rail transit and, 
more recently, the reintroduction of the modern streetcar to America’s 
cities. The Pacific Northwest region has also pioneered impressive 
energy conservation achievements, using “least cost planning” for 
energy facilities to produce the equivalent energy of two Grand 
Coulee dams through conservation measures.8 
We have also made great progress in the areas of land use, air 
quality, and water quality, emerging as a national model worthy of 
study and emulation. My experience with local examples of these 
issues convinced me of the importance of the President’s Executive 
Order of January 2011. In fact, regulatory flexibility and innovation 
have been key to many of our most effective approaches. Starting 
with a key federal decision in the 1970s to allow resources for urban 
freeways to be redirected to light rail and smaller road projects, local 
governments embarked upon a series of partnerships with federal and 
state regulatory agencies that have dramatically enhanced our region’s 
livability and environmental quality. 
My experiences in Portland and in Congress have persuaded me 
that a key element of making regulations work more sensibly is to 
make those regulations “performance-based.” By focusing on desired 
outcomes rather than proscribed procedures, such rules provide 
regulated parties with the latitude to develop solutions that achieve 
the required results within the required time. The rules may describe a 
particular approach or technology as a “safe harbor” that will be 
accepted as complying with the rule; however, that specific tool or 
technique is not required. Instead, regulated businesses, individuals, 
and communities are free to use a variety of solutions as long as they 
achieve the same required results, such as the elimination or reduction 
 
8 Ellyn R. Weiss & James Salzman, The Greening of American Energy Policy, 63 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 691, 699 (1989). 
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of a pollutant, a reduction in workplace accidents, or an improvement 
in wetland function.9 
The following real-world examples clarify the benefits of 
performance-based regulation. At the same time, these examples 
illustrate a point that I will turn to at the end of this Article. If we are 
to overcome the partisanship, rampant skepticism, and 
misinformation that frustrates public discourse today, our political 
system needs some success stories. Such stories would involve 
government programs that deliver tangible improvements with clear 
benefits to the public at minimum cost to the regulated. 
1.  Downtown “Parking Lid” 
In the 1970s, policymakers urged the City of Portland to comply 
with part of an air quality maintenance plan required by the Clean Air 
Act. Together with the EPA and state regulators, the City permanently 
capped the total number of parking spaces in the downtown core10 (at 
the time, downtown Portland had the largest concentration of office 
employment in the metropolitan area). The plan (nicknamed “the 
Parking Lid”) allowed parking when it was part of new development 
in the downtown area, but parking was subject to strict ratios and only 
permitted up to a specified limit.11 
Bolstered by improved vehicle technology, the Parking Lid helped 
the metropolitan region achieve compliance with Clean Air Act 
requirements.12 However, the number of parking spaces in downtown 
Portland was bumping up against the Parking Lid.13 Approaching the 
limit raised the prospect that proposed office buildings would be 
denied parking altogether, thereby hastening the pace at which new 
development was locating outside the downtown area.14 
The city submitted a proposal to the Oregon Department of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ) that detailed a new approach to 
 
9 Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash & Todd Olmstead, Performance-Based Regulation: 
Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 705, 707 (2003). 
10 City Club of Portland Report on Downtown Parking, CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND 
BULL., Mar. 19, 1993, at 285, 287, available at www.pdxcityclub.org/content/downtown   
-parking. 
11 Id. at 287-88. To enable continued growth, the city and region expanded transit 
service to the downtown. Id. at 287. 
12 Janet Christ, Lifting the Lid, OREGONIAN, Aug. 11, 1995, at B1 (on file with author). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
BLUMENAUER 1/10/2012  9:07 AM 
356 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 26, 351 
enforcing limits on ozone and other automobile air pollutants. By 
eliminating the numeric limit (lid) on downtown parking spaces but 
continuing parking ratios and extending those to the areas 
surrounding the original downtown area, the City doubled the land 
area subject to parking regulations.15 The DEQ approved the new 
plan, and incorporated it into the Portland region’s maintenance plans 
for carbon monoxide and ozone.16 The changes to the maintenance 
plan mandated continued compliance with the Clean Air Act while 
extending the transit-oriented and pedestrian-friendly character of the 
original downtown to more of the Central City.17 
2.  EPA Innovative Air Permits 
In the 1990s, Intel Corporation participated in an EPA pilot project 
(administered by the DEQ) to develop an innovative alternative to the 
process-by-process, machine-by-machine agency review required by 
the Clean Air Act’s new source review process. A flexible air permit 
gives companies the freedom to make operational changes at 
manufacturing facilities in exchange for ironclad commitments that 
limit the emissions of air pollutants. 
The DEQ program was one of several state pilot permits supported 
by the EPA over a ten-year period. In 2002, the EPA issued an 
evaluation18 of five of these pilots (including Intel Oregon’s permit) 
that concluded that the pilots had “achieved 30 to 80 percent 
reductions in actual plant wide emissions and/or emissions per unit of 
production.”19 As a result, in 2009 the EPA amended its new source 




16 See Air Qual. Div., Portland Area Carbon Monoxide Maintenance Plan, DEQ (Dec. 
10, 2004), http://www.deq.state.or.us/aq/planning/docs/pdxCOplan.pdf; Central City 
Transportation Management Plan, CITY OF PORTLAND (1995), http://www.pdx.edu/fap 
/sites/www.pdx.edu.fap/files/1995_Central_City_TMP.pdf. 
17 Id. 
18 Office of Air Qual. Planning & Standards, EPA Evaluation of Implementation 
Experiences with Innovative Air Permits, EPA (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.epa.gov/ttn 
/caaa/t5/memoranda/iap_eier.pdf. 
19 Fact Sheet: Final Flexible Air Permitting Rule, EPA (Sept. 29, 2009), 
http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/FAP_FactSheet.pdf. 
20 Id. 
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3.  Extension of Boardman Coal Plant’s Air Conformity Deadline 
Portland General Electric (PGE) and the DEQ are currently 
developing an example of air permitting flexibility aimed at resolving 
the future of Oregon’s only coal-fired electric power plant. EPA’s 
new rules—which require significant reductions in mercury emissions 
and other air contaminants—presented PGE, the Oregon DEQ, and 
environmental advocates with a dilemma. To fully amortize the cost 
of plant improvements needed to fully comply with EPA’s rules by 
their 2014 deadline,21 PGE would need to operate the plant until 
2040.22 The need for the plant until 2040 was bad news for the state 
and environmentalists who wanted to eliminate the plant’s greenhouse 
gases as soon as possible. 
Instead, DEQ and PGE reached a compromise: PGE would make 
partial improvements to the plant, fully meeting the mercury 
reduction requirements and coming close to satisfying other 
provisions of the rule. In exchange, PGE would commit to closing the 
coal-fired plant in 2020 (twenty years earlier than required for full 
compliance).23 This example of flexible administration can become a 
model for performance-based regulatory solutions, and it is exactly 
why the President’s review and the national discussion are so timely 
and important. It is past time to clarify and promote the value of 
flexible solutions that meet compliance objectives in a timely manner. 
B.  The Model for Performance-Based Rules: SO2 Cap and Trade 
Nationally, the most successful application of performance-based 
regulation is the cap and trade regimen for sulfur dioxide (SO2). The 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments established the EPA’s Acid Rain 
Program to address the public health, water quality, and 
environmental ills caused by emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and 
 
21 Statement of Need and Fiscal and Economic Impact Accompanying Proposed Rule 
Changes Relating to Regional BART Haze Rules, Or. Admin. R. 340-223-0060 (proposed 
Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.deq.state.or.us/aq/haze/docs/pge/fiscalEconImpSmtfinal.pdf. 
22 PGE Files Revised Resource Plan with OPUC, PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC 
(Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.portlandgeneral.com/our_company/news_issues/news/04_09 
_2010_pge_files_revised_resource_pl.aspx. 
23 PGE Files New Plan to Close Boardman Coal Plant by 2020, PORTLAND GENERAL 
ELECTRIC (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.portlandgeneral.com/our_company/news_issues 
/news/08_31_2010_pge_files_new_plan_to_close_b.aspx; Scott Learn, PGE’s Coal-Fired 
Boardman Plant Gets Approval to Close in 2020, with Fewer Pollution Controls, 
OREGONIAN (Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf 
/2010/12/pges_coal-fired_boardman_plant.html. 
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nitrogen oxides (NOx) from coal-fired power plants.24 The EPA’s 
rules capped national SO2 emissions at about half the 1980 emission 
level, set deadlines for compliance, and then issued “allowances” to 
each polluter for their share of the emissions permitted under the 
cap.25 Companies that achieved greater than required reductions were 
free to sell their unneeded allowances to the owners of plants that 
needed more time or required more costly retrofits. This market 
flexibility greatly increased the private sector’s motivation to comply, 
as well as the cost-efficiency of their efforts. A 2003 study by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) concluded that “the Acid 
Rain program accounted for the largest quantified human health 
benefits—over $70 billion annually—of any major federal regulatory 
program implemented in the last 10 years, with benefits exceeding 
costs by more than 40:1.”26 This clear success has raised hopes that a 
similar flexible cap and trade system could also work for reducing 
carbon emissions. 
C.  Examples of the Need for Regulatory Reform 
The successful cases where regulatory flexibility has enabled 
faster, cheaper, and environmentally better results make our current 
regulatory approach all the more painful. The following examples 
show the continued need for developing a new regulatory paradigm 
based on outcomes. 
1.  Bull Run Water Filtration 
Federal cryptosporidium regulations, currently a major issue in 
Portland, are a perfect opportunity to implement performance-based 
standards. The city faces a daunting regulatory challenge: eliminating 
cryptosporidium contamination from a public water system that has 
no cryptosporidium. Portland draws its water from the Bull Run 
watershed, a reserve on the slopes of Mt. Hood set aside by the 
United States in 1895. No one lives in the forests above the Bull Run 
reservoir. Public access is prohibited. No logging occurs. The result is 
incredibly pure water—so clean that no filtration is required before it 
 
24 Overview: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/air 
/caa/overview.txt (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
25 Id. 
26 Cap and Trade: Acid Rain Program Results, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/capandtrade 
/documents/ctresults.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). 
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flows into the city’s water system. In particular, no cryptosporidium 
contamination has been detected in the city’s water since 2002.27 
Therein lies the problem. The EPA has written a rule that requires 
unfiltered water systems to be treated with two redundant 
disinfectants to ensure that no cryptosporidium oocysts sicken local 
residents. To comply with EPA rules, Portland must build a treatment 
plant it does not need—despite the fact that a yearlong water-testing 
program showed zero cryptosporidium contamination. Portland is 
now seeking a waiver28 that is not even permitted under EPA rules; 
rather, it relies on a procedure in the Safe Drinking Water Act itself.29  
Its goal is to demonstrate to the Oregon Health Division (the EPA’s 
delegate) that the city can continue to achieve the performance sought 
by the EPA’s cryptosporidium rule30—a specified, very low level of 
oocyst occurrence in water samples—through watershed protection 
rather than through a $100 million new treatment plant.31 
2.  Combined Sewer Overflows 
Federal regulators have been reluctant to embrace new 
technologies that might be cheaper and greener than more traditional 
engineered solutions. For example, engineered solutions for reducing 
combined sewer overflows (CSOs) have been the preferred 
alternative. 
As Commissioner of Public Works for the City of Portland in 
1990, I was charged with developing a program to reduce water 
pollution from our combined sanitary sewer and storm water system. 
This work was my first experience with what seemed to be the 
unnecessary rigidity of the federal regulatory process. The regulatory 
community had little interest in approaches that would have reduced 
 
27 Scott Learn, Tests of Bull Run Water Find No Cryptosporidium; Portland Wants to 
Skip Treatment Plant, OREGONLIVE.COM (Jan. 3, 2011, 8:49 PM), available at http://www 
.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/01/750_samples_of_bull_run_water.html. 
28 Pub. Health Div., Or. Health Auth., Bull Run Variance Request, OREGON.GOV, 
http://public.health.oregon.gov/HealthyEnvironments/DrinkingWater/Pages/BullRun 
VarianceRequest.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
29 Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f (West 1996). 
30 Or. Health Auth., supra note 28. 
31 See Office of Water, Cryptosporidium: Human Health Criteria Document, EPA 
(Feb. 3, 2001), http://water.epa.gov/action/advisories/drinking/upload/2009_02_03 
_criteria_humanhealth_microbial_crypto.pdf. On November 29 the Oregon Health 
Authority’s Public Health Division proposed to grant a variance to the City. Jim Redden, 
City May Win Bull Run Variance from State, PORTLAND TRIB. (Nov. 30, 2011), available 
at www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id=132260611069417200. 
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stormwater overflows through more passive treatment, such as 
bringing urban streams out of concrete pipes into a more natural state 
with bio-filtration; installing bioswales and drainage sumps to capture 
storm water from streets; and disconnecting downspouts from roofs. 
Other communities have successfully employed these and other 
similar steps to reduce the amount of water entering the sewers, 
putting less strain on the system. Had these lower-cost steps been 
implemented, some of the money that was ultimately spent on 
engineered concrete solutions could have been sent to upstream 
farmers and ranchers to reduce water contamination from fertilizers, 
pesticides, and animal waste. This approach would have resulted in a 
cleaner river, with the potential to save a great deal of disruption, 
construction, and money. 
The EPA had a defined solution: giant underground pipes and 
tanks that would hold runoff from large downpours until the city’s 
sewer plants could process the mixture of sewage and millions of 
gallons of rainwater. This gray, concrete solution was known to work, 
albeit at a great cost. In Portland, the system’s total cost was over a 
billion dollars. However, the green solution had never been tested 
because the regulations didn’t allow it. 
The City of Portland started building the first phases of the 
federally required “big pipe” approach. At the same time, it also 
launched the Clean River Program, which included greener solutions.  
Such solutions included restoring wetlands; disconnecting 
downspouts from the sewers; “day lighting” streams long-buried in 
pipes; planting trees and using vegetative filters along stream banks; 
and creating “green streets” to soak up rainwater rather than let it flow 
directly into sewer pipes.32 
By 1999, even though the “big pipes” had been installed or were 
being constructed to serve the northern and western parts of the city’s 
system, Portland had also gained experience with the green 
components of the Clean River Project. Consequently, the City of 
Portland asked the DEQ and the EPA to modify the “Stipulated Final 
Order” governing the sewer cleanup.33 Portland asked to be allowed 
to cancel the largest of the three pipe projects; instead, it wished to 
 
32 Lynne Terry, Portland Hopes Testing Will Help It Avoid Building Water Treatment 
Plant, OREGONLIVE.COM (Jan. 12, 2010, 2:11 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/news 
/index.ssf/2010/01/portland_hopes_testing_will_he.html. 
33 BUREAU OF ENVTL. SERVS., CITY OF PORTLAND, COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOW 
MANAGEMENT PLAN: DRAFT EXECUTIVE REPORT 3-1, 3-5 (1993) (on file with author). 
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rely on vigorous implementation of the natural treatment options of 
the Clean River Program, capturing and diverting enough stormwater 
to prevent sewer overflows into the river as effectively as the “big 
pipe” would. The EPA disagreed—it would continue to require 
concrete storage for runoff. However, state and federal regulators did 
allow the city to reduce the diameter—and cost—of the remaining big 
pipe.34 
Although the natural, lower-cost options came later and at a 
smaller scale than we had originally hoped, the project did benefit 
from their inclusion—lessons that will hopefully benefit other cities 
as they work on their own CSO problems. 
With over 1000 communities struggling with CSOs, opportunities 
abound for demonstrating the value and cost savings of a 
performance-based approach. The City of Philadelphia is currently 
working with EPA Region 3 and the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection to apply these principles citywide to deal 
with their significant water quality problems.35 Officials there hope to 
demonstrate how bioswales, removal of impervious surfaces, and 
rooftop downspout disconnects all hold significant promise for 
environmental protection and enhancing the livability of the city, 
while saving money. 
My hope is that our federal partners are not just experimenting, but 
are actually building flexibility into their compliance requirements. 
The City of Philadelphia is not going away anytime soon. If they fail 
to meet their project commitments, federal regulators can certainly 
force compliance through engineering solutions that rely on “big 
pipes” and traditional treatment. There is little to be lost by allowing a 
reasonable and less expensive plan to proceed. 
3.  “TSUB” 
Water and air quality rules and practices are not the only 
regulations that need to be reexamined. Transportation is filled with 
opportunities for comprehensive performance-based regulations. For 
decades, federal transportation dollars have been allocated for 
 
34 Fact Sheet: Portland Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Management, DEP’T ENVTL. 
QUAL., http://www.deq.state.or.us/about/eqc/agendas/attachments/2007june/L-AttACSO 
Factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
35 See Philadelphia Water Dep’t, Green City, Clean Waters, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, 
http://www.phillywatersheds.org/what_were_doing/documents_and_data/cso_long_term 
_control_plan; see also Building Green: A Success Story in Philadelphia, EPA (2010), 
http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/green/upload/green_building_philly_widescreen.mov. 
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additional highways without any requirement to evaluate the impacts 
of these investments on congestion or air quality, much less their cost-
effectiveness. In fact, highways are often the most expensive way to 
move people and goods, even without considering “external costs” to 
the environment, public health, or a community’s livability. 
Transit investments, however, are a different story. For years, the 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) applied the “Transportation 
System User Benefit” (TSUB) rule36 to measure the effectiveness of 
public transit capital projects.37 However, the TSUB is based on the 
“travel time savings” for a commuter on public transit as compared to 
that of a commuter who drives a car in the same corridor. TSUB 
measurements focus on the distance traveled, vehicle speeds, and the 
amount of automobile congestion—a formula that favors long-
distance commutes with few stops.38 As a result, streetcars and local 
bus projects that provide short trips in urban centers and main 
streets—areas of more compact development where walking, biking 
and transit use make more sense than driving—do not receive the 
federal funding required to implement streetcars and local buses that 
would shorten trips. Shifting the FTA’s focus to performance-based 
standards would enable communities to use federal investments to 
develop urban transit projects that meet local needs. 
III 
THE COMPONENTS OF SUCCESSFUL REGULATORY REFORM 
A.  Essential Elements of Performance-Based Regulation 
Clearly, there is a real opportunity to cut through the regulatory 
morass by using performance-based regulations that focus on the 
desired outcomes (whether those outcomes are to remedy existing 
problems or to avoid creating new ones). Such regulations would 
include these elements: 
1. Comprehensive rather than piecemeal solutions. Successful 
performance-based regulations must clearly identify a standard 
that is at least as strong and protective as the current regulatory 
approach. 
 
36 49 C.F.R. § 611 app. A (2001). 
37 It is important to note here that similar effectiveness evaluations have never been 
required for large, expensive, and often times questionable highway projects. 
38 Dep’t of Transp., Introduction to Major Investment Planning, FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., 
http://www.fta.dot.govt/12304-2416.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
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2. Responsible Partnerships. Government agencies, businesses, 
and industry partners must be held accountable. Parties that have a 
history of abuse, mistakes, or hostility should not be included. 
3. Specific, quantifiable outcomes, transparent processes, and 
measurements. This is not the time for subjective decision-making 
and murky processes; the success of performance-based 
regulations depends on the confidence of the public as well as the 
regulated parties. 
4. Accountability enforcement. If the regulated parties do not 
meet their commitments, there needs to be specific compliance 
measures taken to ensure that public health and safety, taxpayer 
investments, and the environment are protected. Penalties for 
noncompliance should provide disincentives—not just for 
participants, but for others who may consider performance-based 
regulation in the future. The public must have confidence in the 
integrity of the process as well as the likelihood of the outcomes; 
participants must be assured that everyone who partakes will be 
held responsible for meeting the standards. 
5. Voluntary participation, at least initially, as performance-based 
regulations are developed. Whether regulations apply to air and 
water quality, transportation, or finances, affected parties should 
have a variety of ways to comply, including voluntary 
participation in performance-based programs. As we develop a 
track record of successful programs, we will undoubtedly see 
greater interest and participation. Hopefully, we will be able to 
replace traditional regulatory approaches with effective 
performance-based regulations. 
B.  Key Advantages of Performance-Based Regulations 
A performance-based regulatory approach offers several significant 
advantages. First, performance-based regulations create an 
opportunity to foster innovation and harness market forces. 
Harnessing market forces to reduce a power plant’s SO2 and NOx 
emissions is quicker and less expensive than a traditional, prescriptive 
approach. Similar opportunities abound for people to innovate, lower 
costs, and increase markets as they participate in allocating 
responsibilities and benefits. 
Performance-based regulations can also create more incentives for 
compliance. A classic example is the environmental cleanup of 
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Superfund sites, particularly if the site has been “orphaned” (i.e., the 
parties responsible for the contamination are no longer present). Since 
no one has any incentive to clean up the site, there is little or no value 
placed on accelerated performance, getting rid of the pollution faster 
or recycling the land to productive use.39 In other regulatory contexts, 
no one person is actually responsible for the ultimate outcome; for 
example, no one agent is actually responsible for saving an 
endangered species. The current regulatory systems offer no 
incentives for early compliance. As a result, the years of study, 
litigation, struggle, and political dispute embedded in our current 
regulatory framework result in increased costs, continued pollution, 
and ultimately, delays in accomplishing the stated objectives. 
Regulatory reform gives us an opportunity to actualize the benefits of 
earlier compliance, which are certainly real and important. 
By moving to a performance-based system and allowing parties to 
retain any savings gained from earlier compliance, we can reward 
responsible performance rather than punishing those who attempt to 
avoid compliance, delay required activities and investments, and/or 
game the system. Americans have become increasingly concerned 
about the government’s ability to implement solutions at a time when 
federal agencies charged with consumer, financial, and environmental 
protections are stressed, underfunded, and challenged by conflicting 
political demands. This lack of ability poses serious problems. 
However, we can design performance-based regulations to be less 
onerous for regulatory agencies, as well as for those being regulated. 
In a time of great controversy and scarce resources, this is a very 
significant advantage. 
The federal government is ideally equipped to deal with large 
corporations or governments through long-term relationships, funding 
streams, and enforcement powers—capabilities that can be used, 
through performance-based regulatory approaches, to create a less 
adversarial relationship between the regulated and the regulators. 
The existing regulatory processes may no longer be relevant to 
today’s problems. From taxation, to energy, to agriculture, the 
increasing complexity of today’s issues often eclipse the federal 
government’s capacity to implement or enforce meaningful 
regulations using current approaches. Performance-based standards 
 
39 See generally Summary of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Acts (Superfund), EPA, http://www.epa.gov/regulations 
/laws/cercla.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
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that give latitude to individual participants can change that dynamic 
by providing an incentive—as well as the flexibility—to do it faster, 
cheaper, and more efficiently. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The President’s executive order on regulation comes at a critical 
juncture for our nation. The current era of political battles, media 
deconstruction, and special interest empowerment has fundamentally 
altered the political and economic landscape. 
Major issues of our day, such as climate change, have been 
hopelessly distorted. For example, large numbers of the public 
dismiss the consensus of the scientific community, just as they 
continue to entertain and sow doubts about the President’s birthplace 
despite overwhelming factual evidence to the contrary. 
Public opinion polling has consistently shown that Republicans and 
Democrats differ profoundly in their attitudes and beliefs. 
Importantly, it is those different worldviews—those individual frames 
of reference—that determine in significant part how, and whether, 
people perceive factual information.40 
Examples abound. A majority of Americans are convinced that 
President Obama raised taxes when, in fact, the Economic Recovery 
Act reduced tax levels for ninety-five percent of working families.41 
Similarly, half of the American public thinks that gas taxes rise every 
year,42 even though the federal government has not raised gas taxes 
since 1993. This belief greatly complicates our efforts to raise enough 
revenue to rebuild and renew our country and replenish the depleted 
highway trust fund. Finally, surveys repeatedly show that the public 
thinks that the portion of our budget that goes to foreign aid is too 
high—even as they continually overestimate the actual portion (one 
percent) by a factor of ten. 
 
40 See generally GEORGE LAKOFF ET AL., DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! KNOW 
YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (1st ed. 2004). 
41 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009: SECOND 
QUARTERLY REPORT, (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.recovery.gov/About 
/Documents/100113-economic-impact-arra-second-quarterly-report.pdf. 
42 Melissa Lafsky, How Often is the Gas Tax Raised? Most Americans Have No Clue, 
THE INFRASTRUCTURIST (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.infrastructurist.com/2010/01/21 
/how-often-is-the-gas-tax-raised-most-americans-have-no-clue/. 
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It is clear that we need to find a different way to communicate if 
we are to make any progress. A Presidential initiative to embrace 
performance-based regulations would be a powerful step towards 
restoring the American public’s confidence in the government, and it 
would reshape the public’s view of major national issues and 
controversies. 
Creating a tangible outcome that does not require interpretation is 
the most compelling antidote to rampant skepticism about 
government performance. A simple action by the federal government 
would set an unmistakable example of credibility and common sense 
confidence to the American public. For example, we could embrace 
California’s standard for environmental review (which is arguably 
stronger43 than the federal requirement) rather than insisting on a 
separate, redundant, and expensive NEPA process. We should not 
miss the opportunity to do so. 
Allowing a city to save a hundred million dollars by avoiding an 
unnecessary treatment plant to prevent a nonexistent threat from 
cryptosporidium requires no third-party interpretation or political 
spin. Empowering local communities to employ cheaper, greener, and 
simpler technologies for the same or better results is an important step 
in demonstrating that the federal government can listen, process, and 
deliver results. 
As the world changes, it is clear that the United States is going to 
have to operate differently. We will continue to be challenged by the 
intensity of activity, the increased need for subsidies, and questions 
about who benefits, how much, and at what price. To the extent that 
we are able to build a foundation of trust due to successful 
performance-based regulation of essential government functions, that 
ultimate task will be easier and progress will come more smoothly 
and quickly. 
 
43 See David Huard, What is Really Causing Renewable Project Failures in 
California?, ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER (May 17, 2011), https://www.environmentalleader 
.com/2011/05/17/what-is-really-causing-renewable-project-failures-in-california/. 
